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The political economy of quality measurement:




As agricultural products move from being economic commodities to quality-
diﬀerentiated goods, price dispersion within speciﬁc markets increases and implicit
subsidies from high quality producers to low quality producers are removed. The
present paper examines how these distributional eﬀects can inﬂuence patterns of
support and opposition to changes in marketing arrangements. The simple model
developed is calibrated using data from the USA slaughter cattle market. Estimates
of the impact on prices of measuring quality more accurately are found to be
similar in size to previous estimates of market power price suppression in the
market.
1. Introduction
The level of quality measurement and the use of this information in price
determination in many agricultural markets have increased during the last
decade. Examples include measurements of staple length and ﬁbre diameter
in wool markets, baume and colour in wine grapes (e.g. using near-infra-red
spectroscopy and other technological advances), meat marbling and yield in
slaughter livestock markets (e.g. Meat Standards Australia), and many more.
The notion of agricultural goods being homogeneous commodities is of
declining relevance as quality diﬀerentials become reﬂected in large price
diﬀerentials. This can have distributional eﬀects within the group of sellers in
a market if sellers diﬀer in their average quality.
There are many possible reasons why quality diﬀerentials may be emerging
as economically signiﬁcant factors in price determination now after such a
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The Australian Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, 46:4, pp. 515–538long period of being largely ignored. As income levels (exogenously) rise, it is
likely that consumers will become more discriminating in their food
purchases.
1 As national agricultural markets increase in size and national
markets converge with markets of other countries to produce global markets,
opportunities for further product specialisation and diﬀerentiation arise. As
computers, lasers, digital cameras, ultrasound equipment, and other meas-
urement and data management devices become cheaper, the costs of quality
measurement decline.
In addition to these (economic) eﬃciency-driven reasons for the recent
increases in levels of quality measurement in agricultural markets, the
concurrent increase in concentration in many agricultural processing
sectors has raised concerns that quality measurement could be a mechan-
ism for the exercise of monopsony market power by processors. Many
actual and proposed increases in quality measurement have met opposition
from producer groups who claim the changes are designed to separate
producers (multimarket price discrimination) or suppress price (monopsony
power). Although these concerns are real and must be examined
thoroughly, a nagging problem with the opposition from producer groups
is that it is often producers themselves that initiate marketing alternatives
based on quality measurement. In addition, processors (the supposed
beneﬁciaries of this exercise of market power) are often reluctant to
become involved with the changes and they only do so after sustained
producer lobbying.
The present paper examines the distributional eﬀects of pricing on a
quality basis using a simple model of imperfect quality measurement. The
ﬁrst section develops this model and uses it to demonstrate why both support
and opposition to increased quality measurement can come from producers
(sellers) while processors (buyers) remain indiﬀerent to the level of quality
measurement. The second section introduces the USA slaughter cattle spot
market and calibrates the model to this market. The third section examines
an alternative marketing channel that has emerged in the slaughter cattle
market that uses a higher level of quality measurement in price determin-
ation. The fourth section brieﬂy reviews the market power debate that has
evolved in the USA slaughter cattle market, and the ﬁfth section tests if
quality diﬀerentials alone can account for previous empirical estimates of
price eﬀects that were attributed to market power. Concluding remarks on
quality and future research follow.
1 The literature estimating income elasticities for quality traits is still rather small, but the
available evidence does indicate that they tend to be positive. See Gandil (1996) for estimates
on quality traits in housing, Vakil and Russon (1996) for air transport, and McConnell (1997)
for a review of estimates on environmental quality traits.
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The key assumption of the present paper is that, in addition to quality
heterogeneity within a farm, there is quality heterogeneity across farms.
Some producers, whether from diﬀerential managerial talent, land quality
and weather conditions, past investment decisions in genetics and manage-
ment, quality price premiums or any other reason, have higher average
quality agricultural products than other producers. When quality is not
measured, or is measured with a high degree of inaccuracy, the market
determines an average price over quality and high quality producers are
implicitly subsidising low quality producers. An increase in the level of
quality measurement used in price determination removes some or all of this
implicit subsidy by raising the average price that high quality producers
receive and lowering the price low quality producers receive. Overall market
average price remains constant as long as there is no endogenous increase in
market average quality in response to higher quality premiums.
To formalise this notion, Akerloﬀ’s (1970) model of imperfect quality
measurement is used. Hennessy (1996) develops a concise version of this
model for use in agricultural markets and his notation (with slight modiﬁ-
cation) will be adopted. There are two qualities in the model, and as the USA
slaughter cattle market will be used for estimation, these are denoted ‘‘choice’’
(good) and ‘‘select’’ (bad). There are two types of measurement error that can
occur – a choice product can be graded select, and a select product can be
graded choice. The probabilities of these errors are labelled uS|C and uC|S,
respectively. These error probabilities reﬂect the level of quality measurement
(they are technological parameters), and an increase in the level of quality
measurement is reﬂected by a decrease in the error probabilities.
The fraction of total marketings that are choice for a given marketing
period is denoted k (in the USA slaughter cattle market, marketing and price
discovery occur weekly). With k, uS|C, and uC|S, two additional probabilities
can be deﬁned – the probability that a product that grades choice is actually
select, and the probability that a product that grades select is actually choice.
These probabilities are labelled pS|C and pC|S, respectively. Expressions for
these can be derived as follows:
pSjC ¼
ð1   kÞuCjS




ð1   kÞð1   uCjSÞþkuSjC
: ð1BÞ
These expressions simply state that the probability of a product that grades
choice actually being select is the fraction of select product that grades choice
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probability of a product that grades select actually being choice is the
fraction of choice product that grades select divided by the total fraction of
product that grades select. Notice the diﬀerence between the two sets of
probabilities, pS|C and pC|S are (endogenous) ex post conditional probabilities
describing the level of grading error that has occurred (and derived by Bayes’
Rule) while uS|C and uC|S are ex ante technological parameters describing the
degree of measurement error.
The processor (buyer) has some valuation of choice and select derived
from their output market. These valuations are labelled v
C and v
S, respec-
tively. The value of a product that grades choice to a processor is
v
C(1 ) pS|C)+v
SpS|C and the value of a product that grades select is
v
CpC|S +v
S(1 ) pC|S). In a competitive market the prices for choice and
select will be driven to these valuations:
PC ¼ vCð1   pSjCÞþvSpSjC ¼ vC   pSjCðvC   vSÞð 2AÞ
PS ¼ vCpCjS þ vSð1   pCjSÞ¼vS þ pCjSðvC   vSÞ: ð2BÞ
With perfect quality measurement (uS|C ¼ uC|S ¼ pS|C ¼ pC|S ¼ 0), prices





quality measurement causes an averaging of price as the uncertainty is taken
into account. With no quality measurement at all (uS|C ¼ uC|S ¼ 0.5,






Assume each producer in the market produces a uniform number of
products (e.g. each cattle feedlot sells one pen of 100 cattle each marketing
period) and that the proportion of producer i’s product that is choice is ki.
This is the actual quality distribution of the producer’s product. Using this
value and the measurement error parameters, it can be determined that
producer i’s product will grade ~ k ki ¼ð 1   uSjCÞki þ uCjSð1   kiÞ. With meas-
urement error (uS|C „ 0 and/or uC|S „ 0), ki and ~ k ki will diverge. The average
price the producer receives will be pi ¼ ~ k kiPC þð 1   ~ k kiÞPS. As would be
expected, prices are monotonic in quality, that is, ki>kj implies pi>pj. More
interesting, though, is the distribution of prices and how this distribution
changes as the level of quality measurement changes.
The market average price, regardless of the level of quality measurement,
is the average valuation,   p p ¼ ~ k kPC þð 1   ~ k kÞPS ¼ kvC þð 1   kÞvS. Let the
true valuation of a producer’s products be vi ¼ kiv
C+(1)ki)v
S. A producer
with the market average quality, ki ¼ k, will receive the market average
price, which is also the true valuation of that producer’s output, pi ¼   p p ¼ vi.
A producer with below average quality, ki<k, receives a price below the
market average but above the true valuation of their product, vi   pi     p p
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measurement and the second weak inequality is strict if there is at least some
quality measurement, however imperfect). A producer with above average
quality, ki>k, receives a price above the market average but below the true
valuation of their product, vi   pi     p p. In other words, the distribution of
prices will have less variance than the distribution of true valuations, caused
by the averaging eﬀect of imperfect quality measurement. Because the model
overall is zero-sum, the processors pay their valuation for the market
distribution of product quality, but high quality producers receive a lower
price and low quality producers receive a higher price than the valuation of
their products.
As the level of quality measurement increases, prices move away from a
point mass at   p p and towards the actual distribution of vi. The average price
received by low quality producers declines while the average price received by
high quality producers increases. In other words, the cross subsidisation of
low quality producers by high quality producers diminishes as the level of
quality measurement increases. The total payment by processors remains
constant.
This model predicts that high quality producers will support (and expend
resources to achieve), while low quality producers will oppose (and expend
resources to prevent), increased levels of quality measurement. Processors
should be largely indiﬀerent to the level of quality measurement.
2 This
pattern of support and opposition matches very closely recent changes in the
level of quality measurement in the USA slaughter cattle market.
3. USA slaughter cattle spot market
The USA slaughter cattle market is the market between beef cattle feedlots
that feed cattle out to slaughter weight and beef packing ﬁrms who buy the
cattle and begin processing them into meat. In 2001, 36,576,000 head of
cattle were traded, of which about 30 million were steers or heifers (ERS,
2002). Approximately 70 per cent of transactions take place in what the
2 The model developed assumes processing costs do not diﬀer over quality. If they do, the
indiﬀerence of processors may no longer hold. For the particular market under examination,
these diﬀerences are small. Large diﬀerences like mature cows and bulls (versus slaughter
heifers and steers) are largely handled at separate plants and are not a major portion of high
quality measurement trades. The primary quality attributes examined in these high quality
measurement transactions (quality grade and yield grade) are attempts to measure back fat
thickness, marbling and so on, and while they do cause some diﬀerences for processors (higher
levels of back fat require more trimming time and higher quality grade meat gets marketed to
restaurants as opposed to supermarkets, perhaps causing diﬀerential marketing costs) these
diﬀerences are not that economically signiﬁcant relative to the price diﬀerentials being
examined.
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emerged after the decline of terminal markets in the 1960s and 1970s. The
cattle are marketed weekly in pens of 50 to 200 head by show lists that
contain entries for each market-ready pen. Packer procurement agents
obtain the show lists and observe the cattle, eventually placing bids on the
pens of cattle they wish to purchase. Feedlots sell to the highest bidder. See
GIPSA (2000) for a detailed review of marketing practices in the slaughter
cattle market.
It has long been recognised that the cattle traded are of heterogeneous
quality, and the USA Department of Agriculture (USDA) became involved
in quality measurement in 1916. The USDA classiﬁcation system focuses on
the animal’s age, sex, quality grade and yield grade. Quality grade is an
attempt to predict palatability characteristics of the meat (juiciness,
tenderness, ﬂavour, etc.) and consists of the grades (from best to worst)
prime, choice, select, standard, commercial, utility, cutter, and canner.
3
Yield grades range from one (best) to ﬁve (worst) and attempt to measure
the pounds of meat obtained per pound of live animal (and subsequently,
leanness).
The show lists generally contain some data on the background and feeder
management of the pen of cattle which provides an indication of what the
quality of the pen should be. Procurement agents then appraise the quality
distribution (quality and yield grade) of the pen by conducting a quick visual
appraisal. Agents attempt to gauge the age, health, and breeds of the
animals in the pen (conﬁrming the show list background information if
provided) and their levels of fat deposit and muscle growth. The bid made
will be an average of the packer’s quality valuations weighted by the
procurement agent’s visual appraisal of the quality distribution. The visual
appraisal is not very accurate and the result is very little price diﬀerentiation
based on quality. The industry literature often calls the spot market an
average price (over quality) market.
A striking contrast can be made between the choice-to-select price spread
(premium paid to choice grade over select grade) paid to processors in their
output market (the boxed-beef market) and an estimated choice-to-select
price spread paid by processors in the slaughter cattle spot market. The
choice to select boxed-beef price spread should serve as a proxy for the
packer’s input valuation spread (v
C ) v
S) because the marginal processing
costs for choice and select cattle are very similar (see footnote 2).
Unfortunately, no quality prices exist, per se, in the spot market because
3 In addition to the noise introduced by imperfect measurement of the speciﬁed traits,
further noise is introduced by the fact that these traits only serve as proxies for the true quality
characteristics valued by ﬁnal consumers.
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Weighted Average Slaughter Cattle Prices report does provide suﬃcient data
to estimate a choice and a select price spread. See the data appendix for a
description of the procedure used, and Whitley (2000) for a more detailed
discussion.
4
Figure 1 presents these spreads weekly from 1997 to 1999, compiled from
weekly USA Department of Agriculture marketing reports (see the data
appendix for a detailed description). The boxed-beef spread (labelled BB
700–850 Spread) averaged $7.16/cwt while the spot market spread (labelled
Smoothed Spot Spread) averaged $1.53/cwt, with a sample correlation
coeﬃcient of 0.79. The correlation of ﬁrst diﬀerences is only 0.28. Although
there is some diﬀerentiation based on quality, it can be seen that the industry
characterisation of the spot market as an average price market is close to
accurate.
Figure 1 Choice-select price spreads for boxed-beef and spot markets. — —— BB 700-850
spread, - ----Smoothed spot spread. Source: USDA marketing reports, see data appendix for
detailed description.
4 The data and Matlab code used to estimate the spread are available from the author.
The ﬁnal price spread series was smoothed for presentation (this did not eﬀect any
results quantitatively). The band pass ﬁlter weights for the ﬁlter yt ¼ b(L)xt set at 6 weeks are
bj ¼ 2*sin(pj/3)/pj. These weights were approximated with the ﬁlter yt ¼ 0.1039xt)2+
0.2077xt)1+0.3768xt+0.2077xt+1+0.1039xt+2. For comparison on the quality premiums,
see Williams et al. (1993) on cattle and Mullen (1995) on lambs for descriptions of the
respective Australian markets and a more complete development of the methodology for
estimating implicit quality price diﬀerentials (hedonic price regressions).
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USDA marketing reports)
5, can be used to estimate the measurement error
parameters from the model in the previous section. As data are primarily
available for the choice to select spread, it is convenient to express the model
in terms of this spread. Subtracting equation 2B from equation 2A yields the
following expression for the quality price spread:
PC   PS ¼ð vC   vSÞ ð pSjC þ pCjSÞðvC   vSÞ
¼ð vC   vSÞð1   pSjC   pCjSÞ: ð3Þ
This makes the suppression of the quality premium that results from
imperfect quality measurement explicit. The shrinkage of the spread is simply
proportional to the level of imputed assignment error, (1 – pS|C – pC|S). The
observed shrinkage from $7.16/cwt to $1.53/cwt indicates a value in the range
of 80 per cent for pS|C+pC|S.




ð1 uSjC uCjSÞkð1 kÞ









the fraction of marketings grading choice or better) for which weekly data are
available (or can be computed) and two exogenous technological parameters







ð1 uSjC uCjSÞktð1 ktÞ




the nonlinear least squares estimates of the parameters can be found by
choosing the values of uS|C and uC|S that minimise
PT
t¼1e2
t, where t denotes
week and T ¼ 157 is the number of weeks in the three years from 1997 to
1999.
6
The asymmetry of measurement error in the last two terms of the
denominator ensures separate identiﬁcation of the parameters as long as
k „ 0.50. When the quality distribution is 50/50, the quality price spread
5 True market average quality (k) is known because these data are taken from measurement
that takes place in the processing plant, not visual appraisal in the spot market.
6 The data and Matlab code are available from the author.
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separately identiﬁable. Unfortunately, the average quality from 1997 to 1999
was 54.5 per cent and, after adjusting for the grid market selection (see
below), the average was 52.8 per cent. When uS|C and uC|S were entered
separately the estimation failed to converge so u ¼ uS|C ¼ uC|S was imposed.
The nonlinear least squares estimate of u is 40 per cent (the estimate is
0.4020 and its standard error is 0.0293). Computing pC|S and pS|C for each
market week and taking the average gave estimates for these of 42.98 per cent
and 37.55 per cent, respectively. This implies that, on average, from 1997 to
1999 an animal that visually appraised choice had a 38 per cent chance of
actually being select, and an animal that visually appraised select had a 43 per
cent chance of actually being choice. If packers value select animals at
$100/cwt and choice animals at $107/cwt, the spot market price for a choice
(visually appraised) animal would be $104.34/cwt and the spot market price
for a select animal would be $103.01/cwt (with a $1.33/cwt choice premium).
Roughly speaking, the $2.66/cwt lost on animals that grade choice is the
reason high quality producers desire higher levels of quality measurement
and the $3.01/cwt gained on animals that grade select is the reason low
quality producers oppose higher levels of quality measurement.
4. Grid pricing in the USA slaughter cattle market
The last decade has seen the emergence of an alternative marketing channel
in the USA slaughter cattle market that involves a much higher level of
quality measurement. Ward et al. (1996) and Ward et al. (1999) provide
detailed examinations of USA beef cattle marketing (and changes in
marketing arrangements) during this time period. The new marketing
channel is called grid pricing and has grown throughout the last decade to
reach its current level of about 30 per cent of all market transactions.
7 At the
transaction date, processors oﬀer a schedule (grid) of premiums and
discounts for quality traits over a base price (or formula to determine a
base price). The animals are shipped to the packer and slaughtered. Prior to
fabrication (the processing of the carcass into individual primal or retail
cuts), the carcass is graded and the results recorded.
8 Producers are paid
within three to four days of delivery at the plant.
7 This is called ‘‘over-the-hooks’’ marketing in Australia.
8 The grading can be done solely by a USDA grader or by a combination of a USDA grader
(measuring quality and yield grade) and a packer employee (measuring brand speciﬁcation
eligibility, additional measurements, etc.). The market is currently experimenting with addi-
tional measurements and measurement technologies, including digital cameras and ultrasound
equipment.
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previously discussed boxed-beef spread. Not only has the grid spread
followed the boxed-beef spread closely (their correlation coeﬃcient is
0.96), but the mean of the grid spread is $7.40/cwt compared with $7.16/
cwt for the boxed-beef spread.
9 Although the base price adjusts
when moving from the spot market to the grid market, the change from
a $1.53/cwt to a $7.16/cwt choice premium is quite large (cattle prices
average $103/cwt and the feeder’s margin after feeder calf and feed
purchases averages $6/cwt to $7/cwt – see Taylor, 1994, for a breakdown
of feeder ﬁnances).
The emergence of grid pricing has been accompanied by ﬁerce
opposition from producers (feedlots) claiming that it is an instrument for
the exercise of monopsony power by processors who are highly concen-
trated, with a national average four-ﬁrm concentration ratio of over 80 per
cent for steer and heifer slaughter (GIPSA, 2001). Although market power
Figure 2 Choice-select price spreads for boxed-beef and grid priced markets.-----Grid
spread, — —— BB 700-850 spread. Source: USDA marketing reports, see data appendix for
detailed description.
9 An alternative to the imperfect quality measurement explanation for the quality price
spread suppression in the spot market is that packers have used market power to create
artiﬁcial scarcity along the quality margin, thereby deﬂating the quality premium. The higher
average premium in the grid market than the packers’ output market is suggestive, however,
that there is no such suppression in the grid market which, in turn, is suggestive that there is no
suppression in the spot market since a price discriminator still suppresses both markets.
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opposition to grid pricing implies that more is going on. Agricultural
economists have long been arguing in favour of value-based marketing in
livestock markets (see Purcell, 1989), but processors have been reluctant to
change procurement practices. The actual pressure to begin grid pricing
came from producers.
The ﬁrst signiﬁcant grid pricing arrangement was initiated by National
Farms (a producer with 274,000 head capacity) in the late 1980s and was
followed quickly by Cactus Feeders (another producer with 480,000 head
capacity). Both of these are large producers but subsequent entry has
included some of the smallest producers in the market. The Decatur Feed
Alliance was an early entrant (1994) and involves the Decatur County
Feedyard with a capacity of 38,000 head. One group of producers (US
Premium Beef) created a marketing cooperative and bought a large share of
the fourth largest processing ﬁrm (Farmland National Packing) in order to
establish a value based marketing scheme and capture a share of the excess
return they thought would be generated. This group includes producers that
range in size from 200 head to 100,000 head.
This pattern of support and opposition is seen in many other agricultural
markets that are experiencing increases in the level of quality measurement.
The increases are largely producer-initiated and it is other groups of
producers that are opposed. Pure monopsony price suppression is not
compatible with this pattern. Quality cross-subsidisation and multimarket
price discrimination are both compatible. If a more price responsive (elastic)
group of producers knew that diﬀerentiating themselves from the rest of the
producers would result in a reduction in the monopsony price suppression
they were experiencing, then they would favour an alternative marketing
channel that would diﬀerentiate them from the other producers. The present
paper cannot deﬁnitively diﬀerentiate these two possibilities. However, the
following two sections present some suggestive evidence that quality
diﬀerentials alone are able to explain price diﬀerentials between the two
markets.
5. Quality selection and market power
Ward (1987) and Love and Burton (1999) oﬀer theoretical models of how
multimarket price discrimination might be implemented by packing ﬁrms.
Applying their argument to grid pricing would mean that quality measure-
ment was serving as a screening device to separate producers into two groups
(high quality/high elasticity of supply producers and low quality/low
elasticity of supply producers). Several empirical studies have attempted to
measure the relationship between the frequency of non-spot market trades
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way) and the spot market price. Elam (1992), Schroeder et al. (1993), Ward
et al. (1996), Hayenga and O’Brien (1992), and Schroeter and Azzam (1999)
all found some evidence of a negative relationship (the higher the fraction of
total transactions that take place out of the spot market, the lower the spot
market cattle price). Although varied, the results imply that with approxi-
mately 20 per cent of transactions taking place out of the spot market, the
likely decline in the spot market price is in the neighbourhood $0.30 to
$0.40/cwt. These results were interpreted as providing evidence in support of
the price discrimination argument.
Of course, producers selling cattle under a grid pricing scheme faced an
average choice to select quality premium of $7.40/cwt while spot market
cattle were paid a $1.53/cwt quality premium from 1997 to 1999.
Presumably high quality producers self-select into the high quality meas-
urement marketing channel, leaving the average quality in the spot market
lower and causing the average price in the spot market to decline. The
relevant question is thus whether or not quality selection alone can explain
the observed price declines in the spot market. Multimarket price discrimi-
nation would imply a diﬀerential larger than quality diﬀerentials alone can
explain.
There is signiﬁcant anecdotal evidence that quality is not randomly
distributed across transaction types. In 1999, of the 1092 pens National
Farms sold, 882 (81.4 per cent) graded higher (fraction of the pen grading
choice or prime) than the average of the plant they were sold to for that
market week. Over all pens for the year, National Farms averaged 13.7 per
cent higher quality than the plants sold to. US Premium Beef averaged
67.3 per cent choice or prime and 61.3 per cent Yield Grade 1 and 2
marketings for 1999. The national average for 1999 was 56.0 per cent choice
or prime and 51.2 per cent Yield Grade 1 and 2. These higher quality cattle
received higher prices. In 1999, National Farms averaged (over pens)
$1.32/cwt in quality premiums. US Premium Beef averaged $14.85/head in
premiums ($1.98/cwt for a 750 pound carcass).
10
Unfortunately, systematic (aggregate) data are not available on the quality
of marketings by marketing channel or the prices received by marketing
channel. Weekly data are available on the overall distribution of quality and
the number of grid transactions can be approximated weekly. The remainder
of this section presents some summary statistics from this data and the next
section develops a simple model of quality supply to compute rough
10 US Premium Beef data are from their publication USPB Update. The National Farms
statistics are from raw data provided by Mr Glenn Poe.
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between marketing channels.
Weekly data on the (actual) quality distribution of total marketings
over nine traits (prime, choice, select, yield grade one to yield grade ﬁve,
bulls) are available from the USDA report National Steer and Heifer
Estimated Grading Percent Report, and the Breakdown of Reported
Feedlot Volume Report provides the best estimate available of non-spot
market trades by week. Table 1 provides summary statistics of these data. If
the fraction of week t’s marketings of a particular quality are denoted kt
(e.g. the fraction of marketings that grade choice) and the fraction of
the week’s marketings that were non-spot trades are denoted ct, then
the regression kt ¼ a0+a1ct+a2xt+et, where xt is a vector of control
variables and et is a random error term, yields the summary statistic
a1 ¼ E(kt|ct ¼ 1, xt) ) E(kt|ct ¼ 0, xt), the average diﬀerential in quality
between the two marketing channels (e.g. if a1 ¼ 15 and spot market cattle
Table 1 Summary statistics of data and constructed variables
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum
Non-spot trades (c) 18.18% 18.32 4.28 8.37 29.95
Prime marketings 2.16% 2.04 0.53 0.97 3.79
Choice marketings 52.47% 51.95 2.83 46.49 58.91
Select marketings 36.07% 36.90 2.90 28.74 41.16
Y.G. 1 marketings 10.94% 10.72 1.20 8.82 14.56
Y.G. 2 marketings 43.34% 43.49 1.47 40.08 47.17
Y.G. 3 marketings 33.55% 33.91 2.51 27.47 38.92
Y.G. 4 marketings 1.19% 1.19 0.25 0.70 1.70
Y.G. 5 marketings 0.09% 0.09 0.02 0.05 0.16
Bull marketings 1.14% 1.14 0.12 0.74 1.44
Quality premium:
Prime to choice
$6.08/cwt 6.50 0.69 3.83 6.50
Quality premium:
Choice to select
$7.45/cwt 7.50 3.20 2.21 14.58
Quality premium:
Select to standard
$10.01/cwt 9.54 1.78 6.39 14.83
Quality premium:
Y.G. 1 to Y.G. 2
$0.68/cwt 0.50 0.21 0.50 1.13
Quality premium:
Y.G. 2 to Y.G. 3
$1.31/cwt 1.44 0.21 1.00 1.50
Quality premium:
Y.G. 3 to Y.G. 4
$14.90/cwt 14.50 1.29 12.00 18.13
Quality premium:
Y.G. 4 to Y.G. 5
$4.97/cwt 5.00 0.11 4.50 5.00
Quality premium:
Bulls
$)28.12/cwt )28.00 2.77 )36.75 )25.20
Cattle price level $103.00/cwt 103.49 4.99 90.99 112.67
Corn price $2.25/bu. 2.33 0.36 1.67 2.89
Data from USDA Marketing Reports (see data appendix for detailed description).
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Trait
Prime Choice Select Y.G. 1 Y.G. 2 Y.G. 3 Y.G. 4 Y.G. 5 Bulls


























































































Number of observations 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157 157
R
2 0.39 0.70 0.65 0.51 0.25 0.72 0.70 0.57 0.39
Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.

































































































2were 50 per cent choice, then 65 per cent of grid price cattle were
choice).
11,12 Table 2 presents these summary statistics.
13 Control variables
used are base cattle price, quality premium for that trait, corn price, and
three seasonal dummy variables. These variables were obtained from weekly
USDA marketing reports (see data appendix for speciﬁc reports). Table 1
provides their summary statistics.
There is a statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence in average quality across
marketing channels for choice quality grade and yield grades one and three
(prime is signiﬁcant at a 10 per cent level).
14 Fitted values from the estimated
model (with appropriate values for ct) can be used to estimate the average
quality over the three years for each marketing channel. The results imply
that spot market cattle averaged 50.05 per cent choice, 12.62 per cent yield
grade 1, and 30.11 per cent yield grade 3 while non-spot market cattle
averaged 63.34 per cent choice, 3.36 per cent yield grade 1,
15 and 49.07 per
cent yield grade 3. During these three years, the average premiums were $7.45
for choice over select, $0.68 for yield grade 1 over 2, and $14.90 for yield
grade 3 over 4. Unfortunately, these summary statistics cannot be used to
show causation, they simply indicate the degree to which high levels of spot
market transactions are correlated with low market average quality. To show
causation, the supply of quality must be explicitly estimated.
6. Quality supply and price diﬀerentials
This section develops a simple model of quality supply and uses it to estimate
the level of quality selection across marketing channels and the associated
11 E(kt|ct ¼ 1,x) is the average quality when ct ¼ 1 (all cattle are traded in non-spot market
transactions) and E(kt|ct ¼ 0,x) is the average quality when ct ¼ 0 (all cattle are traded in the
spot market). The diﬀerence of these would be the average quality diﬀerence between the
marketing channels.
12 Note that kt (fraction of marketings of a particular quality) was multiplied by 100 per cent
in the empirical work.
13 A regression was estimated for each of the nine quality traits. There are some cross
equation restrictions available from the fact that all yield grades and all quality grades cannot
sum to greater than 100 per cent. Unfortunately these restrictions cannot practically be
imposed because of the control variables.
14 Note that although yield grades one to ﬁve are exhaustive, it is not inconsistent for the
sum of the diﬀerences to be positive since all spot market cattle are not graded.
15 Grid priced cattle having a lower fraction grading yield grade one is actually not sur-
prising given that over the three years examined quality grade premiums were dramatically
larger than yield grade premiums and there is a trade oﬀ in management for the two (feeding
cattle longer raises quality grade but can eventually begin to reduce yield grade).
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supply equation for each grade of quality (i.e. since data are available on nine
diﬀerent grades of quality, specify nine separate supply equations). To
separate the quantity decision (which is not of interest) from the quality
decision (which is of interest), express the quality supplies as fractions of
total marketings. Thus, the supply of a particular grade of quality is
k ¼ k*(p, S, pC) where k is the fraction of total marketings of that grade of
quality (e.g. fraction of total marketings that are yield grade one), p is the
base cattle price, S is the price premium for that grade of quality (e.g. if the
base price is for select animals and the grade of quality under examination is
choice, then the price premium is $7.45/cwt from table 1), and pC is the price
of corn.
16
This model abstracts from at least two potentially important aspects of the
actual supply decision. First, the supply of each grade of quality is not a
separate decision. For a given quantity, the choice is between the grades of
quality. Unfortunately, these cross equation restrictions greatly reduce the
tractibility of the estimations and it was decided to leave them for future
research when more (and higher quality) data have become available.
Second, one of the primary concerns in beef quantity supply estimation is the
dynamic nature of supply. The actual feedlot problem generally involves a
corner solution over feed quantity (feed the animals as much as they will eat)
and the relevant choice variable is the optimal stopping time.
17 This is
relevant for quality choice as well. Feeding the animals longer will ensure
a higher fraction grade choice and prime, but will lower the yield grade.
A limited attempt was made to deal with this in the speciﬁcations below by
using future prices and simple models of price expectation formation. The
results were not aﬀected by these extensions and they will not be discussed
further.
There are currently two primary marketing channels in the slaughter cattle
market (the spot channel and the grid priced channel). Assume that
producers are homogenous within marketing channels so that the entire
quality supply within the channel can be expressed with the above supply
equation. Suppose further that the supply functions diﬀer across marketing
16 This supply equation can be derived from the feedlot’s proﬁt maximisation problem. The
feedlot’s proﬁt equation (when only the base quality and one other grade are being considered)
is p ¼ (p+kS)q ) c(q, k; pC) where q (quantity) and k are the choice variables, p, S, and pC
are parameters to the feelot, and c(•, •; pC) is the feedlot’s cost function.
17 The primary development of the dynamic nature of fed cattle supply is from Yver (1971)
and Jarvis (1974). See also Rosen (1987) and Rosen et al. (1994) for more recent develop-
ments. There is some evidence for this in table 2 where base price enters negatively in several
estimations (although only one negative result is signiﬁcant) and quality premium enters
negatively (and signiﬁcantly) for choice, select, yield grade four, and yield grade ﬁve.
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the producer’s choice of marketing channel. There are now two supply
equations for a particular grade of quality, the spot market supply (SM) and







Producers actually face diﬀerent quality premiums and base price levels in the
two marketing channels. Unfortunately, base price is only available from
spot market trades and quality price premiums are only available from grid
priced trades. Out of necessity, assume that prices and price premiums across
marketing channels are only multiplicative shifts of each other and that these
shifts can be combined with parameter values.
If c is the fraction of total marketings that are grid-priced, then the market





SM). With a func-
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GM, this equation can be estimated. Linear,
quadratic, and semi-log speciﬁcations were all estimated and the results were
similar, for simplicity the linear speciﬁcation will be developed and presented
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Filling these into the market average quality equation yields the market
average quality supply for a particular grade of quality:
k ¼ k
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Three seasonal dummies were also included in each regression.
With data on nine grades of quality, there are nine separate equations of
this form (p, pC, and c are the same for each of the nine equations while k and
S are speciﬁc to the grade of quality being examined). These equations can be
estimated with the 157 weekly observations from 1997 to 1999 used in the
previous section and described in the data appendix. From the estimated
equations the ﬁtted values:
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GM   k
SM ¼ b4 þ b5p þ b6S þ b7pC ð8Þ
yield the quality diﬀerences between the two marketing channels. More
speciﬁcally, if the ﬁtted value for the choice quality grade equation were
estimatedtobe12,thenthatwouldimplythatifthespotmarkettradesaverage
50 per cent choice then the grid market trades averaged 62 per cent choice.
Table 3 presents these ﬁtted values for each of the nine quality traits in the
ﬁrst column labelled model 1 (the full estimation results with all parameter
estimates are available from the author). As can be seen, there is a
statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence (i.e. the ﬁtted value is statistically signiﬁ-
cant) for choice, Yield Grade 1, and Yield Grade 3. Grid-priced cattle
average 12.17 percentage points more grading choice than spot market cattle
(e.g. if 50 per cent of spot market cattle graded choice, then 62.17 per cent of
grid price cattle graded choice), similarly grid price cattle average 9.31
percentage points less grading Yield Grade 1 than spot market cattle and
19.89 percentage points more grading Yield Grade 3 than spot market cattle.
These results can be used to infer average price diﬀerences across
marketing channels (because direct data are not available on this). If   p pSM
is the average price in the spot market channel and   p pGM is the average price in
the grid market channel, then for one grade of quality the price diﬀerential is
computed by   p pGM     p pSM ¼ Sðk
GM   k
SMÞ. Computing this for each grade of
quality and adding the price diﬀerences yields the total price diﬀerence
Table 3 Quality selection across marketing channel and price premiums
Model
Estimate 1 2 3 4
Prime 0.15 (0.97) 0.10 (0.96) )0.06 (1.02) )0.49 (1.07)
Choice 12.17* (4.50) 11.48* (4.47) 12.20* (4.79) 10.71* (4.95)
Select )3.44 (5.16) )4.03 (5.04) )1.12 (5.48) )6.95 (6.03)
Y.G. 1 )9.31* (2.58) )9.35* (2.57) )7.61* (2.83) )7.64* (2.92)
Y.G. 2 3.78 (3.74) 3.63 (3.96) 5.30 (4.04) 4.60 (4.38)
Y.G. 3 19.89* (4.30) 20.79* (4.20) 15.75* (4.87) 18.48* (4.96)
Y.G. 4 )0.09 (0.36) )0.01 (0.35) )0.35 (0.39) 0.11 (0.42)
Y.G. 5 )0.04 (0.05) )0.02 (0.05) )0.08 (0.05) )0.06 (0.05)
Bulls )0.01 (0.28) )0.03 (0.27) 0.05 (0.29) 0.01 (0.29)
Price diﬀerential:
Grid to spot
3.39* (0.11) 3.34* (0.09) 3.22* (0.14) 2.65* (0.14)
Price diﬀerential:
Market ave. to spot
0.62* (0.02) 0.61* (0.02) 0.61* (0.03) 0.47* (0.03)
Standard errors in parentheses, * denotes signiﬁcance at 5% level.
Note: Each quality trait cell represents a ﬁtted value from a separate regression. The models estimated
were: 1) OLS; 2) OLS with base price excluded; 3) 2SLS with pig and poultry wholesale prices as
instruments for base price; 4) 2SLS with nearby live cattle futures contract price as an instrument for base
price. Data from USDA marketing reports.
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18 Similarly, the overall market average
price is   p p ¼ c  p pGM þð 1   cÞ  p pSM and the diﬀerence between the overall market
average price and the average price in the spot market is given by
  p p     p pSM ¼ cð  p pGM     p pSMÞ. This last expression is particularly interesting
because it represents the decline in the average price for spot market cattle
that results from the presence of the grid pricing channel.
Using all nine quality traits
19 the estimates in table 3 indicate that there
was a statistically signiﬁcant average price diﬀerence between grid and spot
market cattle of $3.39/cwt and a price diﬀerence of $0.62/cwt between the
overall market average price and the spot market price.
20 The second
estimate is the relevant estimate to compare with the empirical results from
past studies reported above. This is the price increase that would occur in the
spot market if all cattle were sold in the spot market. In other words, this is
the decline that occurs in the spot market price when high quality cattle move
into the grid priced marketing channel. The quality price diﬀerential
estimated here is actually larger than the estimates reported above from
the market power literature (the average result in that literature is about
$0.30 to 0.40/cwt). This may arise from the fact that grid pricing has been
increasing in use and composed a smaller fraction of total market
transactions during the time periods of the earlier studies. Overall, the
results are suggestive that quality diﬀerentials alone are able to explain the
price divergences between marketing channels and the negative relationship
between the level of non-spot market transactions and spot market price
found in the previous studies that were attributed to market power. The
previous studies found a price decrease in the spot market of $0.30 to
$0.40/cwt from the presence of non-spot market transactions, the present
study has found that the quality selection that should arise from the presence
of a grid pricing channel alone predicts a $0.62/cwt price diﬀerence.
18 When all quality traits are examined, the computation becomes more complicated
because not all increases in a particular grade of quality come from the next lowest grade of
quality. In the estimations reported it is assumed that increases in prime and choice quality
grade come from animals that would have graded select, the increase in yield grade two and
part of the increase in yield grade three come from the decline in yield grade one, and the
remaining increase in yield grade three comes from yield grade four.
19 Because estimating ﬁtted values is the object of the exercise, it is appropriate to use all
estimates taking into account their degree of uncertainty (standard errors). Even so, using only
the statistically signiﬁcant quality diﬀerentials yields virtually identical results that are even
more statistically signiﬁcant.
20 The small standard errors reﬂect that the reported estimates are an average of the
157 point estimates (one for each week). Of the 157 point estimates, the average standard error
for the grid to spot price diﬀerential is 1.36 and for the market to spot price diﬀerential is 0.25.
Of the 157 weeks, 119 have statistically signiﬁcant (at 5 per cent) price diﬀerentials.
Political economy of quality measurement 533
  Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002The above supply estimations have implicitly assumed exogeneity of the
control variables. This is probably reasonable for corn price (pC), but may be
less so for cattle base price (p), quality premium (S), and fraction of non-spot
transactions (c). Since marginal fabrication costs do not vary widely over
carcasses of varying quality, it will be assumed in the present paper that
quality price premiums (S) largely pass through the packing plant and are
suﬃciently exogenous to be used without concern.
21 In addition, because
feedlots participating in grid pricing schemes generally sell exclusively under
the scheme and do not move back and forth between marketing channels, the
bulk of weekly variation in non-spot market transactions simply comes from
the quantity decisions of sellers in the two marketing channels leaving this
variable (c) largely exogenous from a weekly perspective.
However, none of these arguments are reasonable for the base price level.
To control for this potential endogeneity problem, several alternative
estimations were performed. Model 2 in table 3 presents the results when
base price is simply excluded from the regressions. Model 3 presents results
where pork and chicken wholesale prices (demand shifters) and all
exogenous variables are used as instruments for price level, and model 4
uses the nearby live cattle futures contract price and all exogenous variables
as instruments for price level. As can be seen, the results are very robust to
these extensions.
7. Conclusion
The rise in quality measurement seen in many agricultural markets in recent
years has been met by opposition from some groups of producers and has
been openly promoted by others. This calls into question the standard market
power arguments often used by opponents of the marketing changes. The
present paper has presented a simple model of imperfect quality measure-
ment that is compatible with this pattern of opposition and support and,
when estimated in the context of the USA slaughter cattle market, implies
price eﬀects large enough to be driving observed actions. Empirical estimates
demonstrate that self-selection of high quality cattle out of the spot market is
large enough to explain price declines that were attributed to monopsony
price suppression in previous papers.
The model in the ﬁrst two sections of this paper has followed the literature
and assumed that quality supply is perfectly inelastic with respect to price
(base price level and quality premium). An exogenous, perfectly inelastically
supplied factor like managerial talent or weather determined ki and there was
21 Excluding price premiums from the estimations slightly increases the estimated price
diﬀerentials.
J.E. Whitley 534
  Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society Inc. and Blackwell Publishers Ltd 2002no endogenous response to the level of quality premiums. The later sections
allowed quality supply choice to be endogenous and estimated a simple
speciﬁcation for quality supply. Results were suggestive that there is selection
of higher quality cattle out of the spot market into the grid priced marketing
channel. This selection may have led to a price decline in the spot market of
more than $0.60/cwt.
The last few years has seen a dramatic increase in the collection and quality
of data on product quality. Most of the data used in the present paper began
to be collected in 1997. As the quantity and quality of data improve, more
rigorous and thorough empirical work will be possible.
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Appendix
The majority of the data used in the present paper are from USDA market
news reports and cover the 157 weeks from 1997 to 1999. Table 1 provides
summary statistics for selected variables. The Estimated Composite of Boxed
Beef Cut-Out Values Report constructs a daily estimate of the value of a
fabricated beef carcass by adding together the prices of the individual cuts of
meat that comprise the carcass. Choice and select prices are computed for
carcasses that weigh 550–700 pounds and for carcasses that weigh 700–
850 pounds. These prices, less marginal processing cost, are the packers’
valuation for slaughter cattle. As fabrication costs are roughly the same for
choice and select carcasses, the boxed-beef choice-select spread can be used as
a proxy for the choice-select valuation spread (see footnote two). The
National Premiums and Discounts for Slaughter Steers and Heifers Report
collects at the beginning of the week by phone, surveying the high, low, and
average premium (or discount) for a variety of quality traits oﬀered by
packing plants in grid priced procurement each week. The report was started
in 1997 and did not include an average for the ﬁrst two years, for these years
a simple average of the high and low was used.
The Weekly Weighted Average Slaughter Cattle Prices Reports were used
to impute the spot market choice to select spread. They provide pen prices for
ﬁve geographical regions broken down into ﬁve quality categories. The
regions are Texas/Oklahoma, Kansas, Nebraska, Colorado, and Iowa/
Southern Minnesota. These regions accounted for 73 per cent of total
federally inspected USA slaughter from July to December, 1999. The quality
categories are pens that visually appraise 0 per cent–20 per cent choice, 20 per
cent–35 per cent choice, 35 per cent–65 per cent choice, 65 per cent–80 per
cent choice, and 80 per cent–100 per cent choice. Prices are further broken
down by sex and pricing basis (live weight or carcass weight), yielding four
replications of the geographical and quality categories. For a given market
week, then, if the average quality in a category is assumed to be the categories
midpoint (i.e. the average quality of the 65 per cent–80 per cent range is 72.5
per cent choice) there are 100 potential equations to solve for the two quality
prices (regions do not report transactions in all categories and most weeks
averaged about 40 price/quality pairs). Using least squares criteria and
weighting by the number of head traded in each category, estimates were
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per cent (to calibrate carcass and live weight pricing) and level shift dummies
for region and sex were used. Nine weeks (primarily Christmas and other
holiday weeks) had too few observations to estimate and linear interpolation
was used to estimate their values.
The National Steer and Heifer Estimated Grading Percent Report provides
weekly overall quality breakdowns by geographic regions. The spot market
price data includes Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Nebraska, Oklahoma, Texas,
and Southern Minnesota. The quality report includes these states (except
Southern Minnesota) and Arkansas, Louisiana, Missouri, New Mexico,
Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming. From June to
December 1999, these additional states accounted for less than 4 per cent of
total federally inspected slaughter for the whole region. This mismatch is
ignored. The quality report provides overall market average quality, the
relevant quality for the estimation of Hennessy’s model is spot market
average quality. This was estimated by correcting for the quality selection
found in the third section of the main text.
The estimation of the level of quality selection uses the above variables,
corn prices, and the fraction of grid marketings. Corn prices for the regions
were collected from individual USDA market news oﬃces and state
Departments of Agriculture. The most diﬃcult to obtain variable is the
level of captive versus spot marketings. The Breakdown of Reported Feedlot
Volume Report provides the best weekly estimate available of captive supply
marketings. The report provides data for four regions, Texas/Oklahoma,
Kansas, Colorado, and Nebraska/Wyoming. For these regions, the report
lists cash sales and additional movement, which includes: (i) cattle that are
fed by or for packers; (ii) contract or formula agreements; (iii) cattle ﬁnanced
by packers and slaughtered by the same packer; and (iv) cattle committed to
packers with the price non-negotiated prior to change in ownership. The
fraction of grid marketings is computed by dividing the additional movement
in a week by the total slaughter (from the National Steer and Heifer Estimated
Grading Percent Report) for the week.
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